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  Consumer contracts typically include class arbitration waivers, or 
clauses that prevent consumers from asserting class claims within 
arbitration. By limiting consumers’ ability to hold businesses liable, 
these waivers allow companies to continue illegal activity. Although 
class arbitration waivers have the potential to impose significant harm 
on consumers, commentators have yet to identify an adequate 
solution. This Note examines commentators’ most commonly 
proposed solution—legislation prohibiting class arbitration waivers. It 
argues that prohibiting use of class arbitration waivers is an 
insufficient solution. Supporters of such a response assume that class 
arbitration would provide consumers with sufficient relief while 
adequately protecting the rights of the parties involved. The rules 
governing class arbitration, however, sacrifice important party rights, 
suggesting that increased use of class arbitration might provide 
consumers little relief. After demonstrating these shortcomings, this 
Note then proposes three alternative solutions: lowering consumers’ 
arbitration costs, increasing administrative enforcement, and limiting 
choice-of-law provisions within arbitration agreements. 
INTRODUCTION 
“If [mandatory arbitration] catches on, it could wipe out years of 
progress in consumer protection.”1 That was one commentator’s 
warning in the early 1990s, when companies began including 
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provisions in consumer contracts requiring all disputes to be resolved 
through arbitration. Unfortunately for consumers, such warnings fell 
on deaf ears. Since the early 1990s mandatory arbitration has 
gradually gained judicial acceptance.2 American companies 
increasingly include certain remedy-stripping clauses within the 
arbitration provisions of consumer contracts.3 One example is the 
class arbitration waiver clause (class arbitration waiver or class 
waiver), which precludes consumers from asserting a class claim 
during arbitration.4 Class arbitration waivers prohibit consumers from 
aggregating their claims and, in many instances, leave low-value 
claimants without a remedy. 
To understand the harsh and unfair implications of class waivers, 
consider the story of Gene Dale and other Atlanta-area Comcast 
Cable subscribers. In 2005, Dale alleged that Comcast had unlawfully 
imposed on its subscribers franchise fees in excess of the amount 
permitted by federal law.5 As a result, every three months, Dale 
received a cable bill that was $0.66 higher than it otherwise should 
have been.6 Over the four-year period that Dale had subscribed, 
Comcast overcharged each subscriber by a total of $10.56,7 resulting 
in a windfall to Comcast of nearly $640,000.8 Unfortunately for Dale, 
recovering that fee would be difficult; in 2004, he unknowingly agreed 
to arbitrate any claims against Comcast when he paid a bill that 
contained a mandatory arbitration agreement.9 That bill included a 
class arbitration waiver preventing subscribers from asserting any 
claims on a consolidated basis.10 As a result, Dale could either spend 
 
 2. For a discussion of the Supreme Court’s gradual acceptance of mandatory arbitration 
agreements, see infra notes 37–47 and accompanying text. 
 3. For a discussion of the right of remedy-stripping clauses, see infra notes 49–51 and 
accompanying text. 
 4. For a more detailed explanation of the right of class arbitration waivers, see infra Part 
I.B. 
 5. Brief of Appellants at 2, Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216 (11th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-
15516-C), 2006 WL 4126913. 
 6. Id. at 14. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1220. 
 9. Id. at 6. Comcast inserted the arbitration agreements in envelopes containing 
subscribers’ monthly bills. Id. The agreements provided that by paying the enclosed bill, the 
subscriber agreed to arbitrate any future claims. Id. 
 10. Id. 
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hundreds of dollars in arbitration and attorneys’ fees11 in hopes of 
recovering $10.56 or simply pay the extra $0.66 every three months. 
Although the Eleventh Circuit eventually held Comcast’s arbitration 
agreement unconscionable,12 which allowed subscribers to assert a 
class claim, many courts consider class waivers entirely enforceable 
against consumers.13 
Not surprisingly, commentators have criticized courts adopting 
the latter view. Several scholars have demonstrated that class waivers, 
by rendering many valid claims economically unfeasible, have a 
disastrous impact on consumers’ abilities to prevent businesses from 
engaging in unfair and potentially illegal activities.14 Yet these 
critiques fall short in one important respect—they fail to adequately 
examine and identify potential solutions. Commentators summarily 
conclude that legislation prohibiting class waivers is both necessary 
and sufficient to provide low-value claimants adequate relief from 
business misconduct.15 Extensive analysis shows that it is neither. This 
Note examines the likely implications of such a legislative response 
and demonstrates that legislation prohibiting class waivers is not a 
viable solution. It then proposes three alternative solutions that 
scholars should examine further to give consumers meaningful 
protection in arbitral proceedings. 
This Note begins with background information on class 
arbitration waivers. Part I explains what these clauses are, why they 
are detrimental to consumers, and why more and more companies 
include them in their arbitration agreements. This Part also examines 
how courts have treated class waivers. Part II discusses the response 
of consumer advocates to class waivers and explores the solution that 
commentators most often suggest—legislation prohibiting class 
waivers. Part III explains why such legislation would not redress the 
problems with arbitration. It examines the likelihood of legislative 
action and explains that preventing businesses from using class 
waivers would result in grossly unfair arbitral proceedings. Finally, 
 
 11. For a detailed discussion of the high costs of arbitration, see infra Part III.B. 
 12. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1217. 
 13. For an examination of various courts’ treatment of class waiver clauses, see infra Part 
I.C. 
 14. For a summary of scholarly critiques of class waiver clauses, see infra notes 58–68 and 
accompanying text. 
 15. For a summary of potential solutions identified by scholars thus far to class waiver 
clauses, see infra Part II. 
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Part IV identifies three alternative solutions to this problem: first, 
courts, legislatures, or arbitration bodies could shift attorneys’ fees 
and arbitration costs from consumers to defending companies; 
second, legislatures could rely on administrative agencies to deter 
business misconduct; third, Congress should limit choice-of-law 
provisions in arbitration agreements.16 
I.  CLASS ARBITRATION WAIVERS: HISTORY & USE 
Predispute arbitration agreements are simply contracts between 
two parties.17 Each party, by accepting the agreement, promises to 
arbitrate, rather than litigate, any disputes that arise between them. 
Like any contract, mandatory arbitration agreements contain specific 
provisions detailing terms such as where the arbitral hearing will be 
held, who will conduct the hearing, and how the parties will split fees 
associated with the proceeding.18 By agreeing to the contract, the 
consumer not only forgoes the right to assert a claim in court but also 
agrees to be bound by any provision within the arbitration agreement. 
Class arbitration waivers are an example of a remedy-stripping 
provision typically included within predispute arbitration contracts.19 
Class waivers preclude consumers from asserting claims on a class 
 
 16. At the outset, it is necessary to note that arbitration and class arbitration waivers are 
prevalent in a number of areas. As Professor Gilles points out, class waivers have the potential 
to limit consumer, antitrust, securities, employment, and civil rights claims. Myriam Gilles, 
Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 373, 413 (2005). Each type of claim raises unique issues, the examination of 
which is beyond the scope of this Note. Therefore, this Note considers only the potential 
implications on consumers and consumer claims. Consumer claims “encompass[] actions against 
mortgage lenders, credit card companies, commercial banks, and others under truth in lending 
and fair credit statutes; unreasonable charges claims against telecommunication carriers . . . ; 
deceptive trade practices and false advertising claims against manufacturers and service 
providers; and numerous other actions.” Id. at 414. 
 17. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) 
(recognizing that the Federal Arbitration Act “is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the 
enforcement of private contractual agreements”); H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) 
(“Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract . . . . An arbitration agreement is placed 
upon the same footing as other contracts, where it belongs.”). 
 18. See Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A 
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 127, 131 (2006) (identifying clauses typically included within arbitration 
agreements). 
 19. F. PAUL BLAND, JR., ET AL., NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 5 (5th ed. 2007) (“The vast majority of arbitration clauses in use 
in consumer contracts throughout the United States explicitly prohibit consumers from bringing 
or participating in class actions.”). 
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basis within arbitration. As this Part explains, class waivers have the 
potential to impact a significant number of consumers because more 
and more businesses are turning to these clauses to insulate 
themselves from class claims. To understand how and why class 
waivers developed, it is first necessary to understand the United 
States’s dependence on arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism. 
A. The Rise of Judicial Deference toward Arbitration Agreements 
The acceptance of arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism 
in the United States dates back to the colonial period; merchants 
routinely used arbitration to settle disputes as early as the 
seventeenth century.20 Even then, proponents regarded arbitration as 
not only faster and cheaper than litigation but also more private, less 
adversarial, and fairer.21 With the advent of the railroad in the 
nineteenth century, distant merchants incorporated arbitration 
provisions into contracts to avoid what they considered to be biased 
local forums.22 By the twentieth century, both businesses and 
consumers believed arbitration agreements to be an effective way to 
avoid the significant costs and delays associated with litigation.23 
Support for arbitration as an efficient method of conflict 
resolution was not limited to the disputants themselves.24 In 1925, 
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in an effort to 
recognize and enforce private arbitration agreements.25 The FAA 
requires courts to compel arbitration when the parties have formed a 
valid agreement to arbitrate.26 Its passage reflected a congressional 
 
 20. Bruce L. Benson, An Exploration of the Impact of Modern Arbitration Statutes on the 
Development of Arbitration in the United States, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 479, 481 (1995). 
 21. Id. at 482. 
 22. Paul D. Carrington & Paul Y. Castle, The Revocability of Contract Provisions 
Controlling Resolution of Future Disputes Between the Parties, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
207, 215 (Winter/Spring 2004). 
 23. See 500 Trade Cases Are Arbitrated, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1924, at E3 (discussing the 
low costs and lack of delay that parties to arbitration proceedings reported). 
 24. See Benson, supra note 20, at 481 (noting that, along with the federal government, 
numerous states passed arbitration statutes in the 1920s). 
 25. Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended 
at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2006)). 
 26. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (“The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the 
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the 
court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement.”). 
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belief that arbitration agreements were worth enforcing in an 
increasingly transactional nation.27 
Acceptance of arbitration was not universal, however. 
Nineteenth and early twentieth century judges remained skeptical of 
the process’s supposed benefits.28 Courts considered arbitration a 
lawless procedure in which arbitrators, unlike judges, were in no way 
obligated to enforce the law.29 Disputants, the judiciary argued, could 
not expect adequate relief in such an informal process.30 As a result, 
courts at the time adhered to the doctrine of revocability, under 
which courts considered agreements to arbitrate entirely rescindable 
and routinely held them unenforceable.31 Even the enactment of the 
FAA, Congress’s explicit attempt to force judges to accept arbitration 
as a valid dispute mechanism,32 proved insufficient.33 For instance, 
more than twenty-five years after the FAA’s enactment, the Supreme 
Court in Wilko v. Swan34 invalidated an arbitration agreement 
between a securities brokerage firm and its customer, openly 
 
 27. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 3 (1924) (presenting the Senate Judiciary Committee’s belief 
that arbitration agreements are valuable). 
 28. E.g., H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2 (1924) (“Some centuries ago, because of the jealousy 
of the English courts for their own jurisdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to 
arbitrate . . . . This jealousy . . . became firmly embedded in the English common law and was 
adopted with it by the American courts.”); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 593, 619–20 (2005) (“[T]he law had been ambivalent about enforcing obligations 
to participate in private dispute resolution at the expense of access to public processes. Judges 
guarded their own monopoly power and regularly refused to enforce arbitration contracts.”). 
 29. See Resnik, supra note 28, at 620 (“Jurists found arbitration too flexible, too lawless, 
and too informal when contrasted with adjudication, esteemed for its regulatory role in 
monitoring adherence to national norms.”). 
 30. See, e.g., Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 380 (1868) (“[A] covenant to refer disputes to 
arbitration is but an unprofitable covenant, affording only the shadow of relief at law, and 
neither substance nor shadow in equity.”). 
 31. See Carrington & Castle, supra note 22, at 212 (“[T]he principle of revocability was 
widely accepted by nineteenth century U.S. courts . . . .”); Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth 
Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 265 (1926) (describing 
legislative attempts to overcome “the hoary doctrine that agreements for arbitration are 
revocable at will and are unenforceable”). The Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the doctrine 
of revocability on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 
451 (1874) (“[A man] may submit his particular suit by his own consent to an arbitration . . . . He 
cannot, however, bind himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, 
thus to forfeit his rights at all times and on all occasions . . . .”). 
 32. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 33. Matthew Eisler, Note, Difficult, Duplicative and Wasteful?: The NASD’s Prohibition of 
Class Action Arbitration in the Post-Bazzle Era, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1891, 1900–01 (2007). 
 34. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
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questioning the ability of arbitrators and the arbitration process to 
effectively decide disputes.35 
In the 1980s the judiciary finally accepted arbitration as a valid 
procedure. Courts, frustrated by the growing problems of litigation, 
turned to arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms to efficiently and inexpensively resolve disputes.36 In a 
host of decisions between 1983 and 1990, the Supreme Court readily 
acknowledged that the FAA mandates arbitration when the parties 
have a predispute agreement to arbitrate.37 In 1983, the Court 
declared in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury 
Construction Corp.38 that the FAA signifies “a liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements.”39 Whereas the Court viewed 
arbitration with skepticism just thirty years earlier,40 it maintained in 
Moses H. Cone that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitral 
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.”41 Just two years 
later, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,42 
the Court not only acknowledged several advantages of arbitration43 
but also concluded that concerns over “potential complexity should 
not suffice to ward off arbitration,”44 a conclusion quite different from 
the one reached in Wilko. Finally, in Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/American Express, Inc.45 in 1989, the Court expressly 
overruled the Wilko decision, declaring that it was improperly based 
on the “outmoded presumption of disfavoring arbitration 
proceedings.”46 Less than forty years after deeming predispute 
 
 35. Id. at 436–38. 
 36. See Catherine Cronin-Harris, Mainstreaming: Systematizing Corporate Use of ADR, 59 
ALB. L. REV. 847, 851–53 (1996) (noting that significant dissatisfaction with the court system 
throughout the 1970s led judges to pursue alternative dispute resolution). 
 37. E.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (“By its terms, the 
[FAA] leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates 
that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration . . . .”). 
 38. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 39. Id. at 24. 
 40. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 41. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24–25. 
 42. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 43. Id. at 628. 
 44. Id. at 633. 
 45. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 46. Id. at 481. 
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arbitration agreements a violation of public policy, the Court fully 
embraced arbitration as a valid mechanism for resolving disputes.47 
B. The Birth of Class Arbitration Waivers and the Criticism That 
Followed 
What, if any, impact the Supreme Court’s decisions in the 1980s 
had on the prevalence of arbitration agreements in consumer 
transactions is unclear.48 What is clearer, however, is that the decisions 
transformed the type of arbitration agreements used by businesses in 
consumer transactions in the 1990s and 2000s. Corporations hoped 
that the judiciary’s newfound fervor for arbitration agreements would 
enable them to create agreements that reduced their overall liability 
to consumers.49 As a result, drafters began incorporating into their 
standard arbitration agreements what one commentator has termed 
“remedy-stripping” clauses.50 For instance, arbitration agreements 
have come to regularly include clauses limiting the type or amount of 
damages available, the recoverability of attorneys’ fees, and the 
length of statute of limitations periods.51 For consumers, such clauses 
make it either more difficult to assert claims in the first place or less 
likely that they will prevail on claims in arbitration. Either way, the 
drafters decrease the chances of their corporate client being held 
liable. 
Companies seeking to evade class action litigation introduced the 
class arbitration waiver as one such provision. Corporate defendants 
 
 47. See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution and 
Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211, 225 (1995) (describing the Supreme Court’s 
recognition that “[p]ublic policy no longer prohibits arbitration”). 
 48. Compare David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee 
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 36 
(“With the Court’s enthusiastic approval, pre-dispute arbitration clauses . . . have increasingly 
found their way into standard form contracts of adhesion.”), and Katherine Van Wezel Stone, 
Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 
956 (1999) (“As a result of these expansive legal doctrines, arbitration clauses are ubiquitous in 
consumer transactions today.”), with Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” 
to Arbitrate Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 62 (Winter/Spring 2004) (finding that just over one-third of the 
average consumer transaction contracts contained an arbitration clause). 
 49. Gilles, supra note 16, at 396. 
 50. David S. Schwartz, Understanding Remedy-Stripping Arbitration Clauses: Validity, 
Arbitrability, and Preclusion Principles, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 53–59 (2003). 
 51. Id. at 57–58. 
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detest class action litigation.52 The procedure aggregates plaintiffs’ 
claims, many of which plaintiffs could not bring without the class 
action device.53 Class action litigation increases the chance that a 
defendant will face substantial damage awards, so much so that 
defendants may feel pressure to settle the claims.54 To combat these 
problems, corporate attorneys in the 1990s urged their clients to 
include within their arbitration agreements provisions preventing 
consumers from asserting class claims.55 Their corporate clients 
listened. Many consumer arbitration agreements began to contain a 
clause providing that the consumer, by accepting the agreement, 
waives the right to arbitrate on a class basis.56 These provisions leave 
consumers in an untenable position: the arbitration agreement 
forecloses use of the courtroom (and thus traditional class-action 
litigation), while the class waiver bars class arbitration.57 
Consumer advocates have attacked this result as unfair. They 
insist that the class device is often necessary to provide individual 
consumers an adequate remedy.58 A consumer claim is typically a 
negative value claim—that is, the consumer’s potential award is small 
while the costs of asserting that claim are significant, resulting in an 
 
 52. E.g., Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357, 1429 (2003) (“By aggregating hundreds, thousands, or even millions of 
claims, the class action can make small claims viable and empower claimants in other ways. 
Defendants dislike class actions for this reason.”). 
 53. Christopher R. Leslie, The Significance of Silence: Collective Action Problems and Class 
Action Settlements, 59 FLA. L. REV. 71, 73 (2007) (“The class action process facilitates the 
aggregation of numerous small claims in order to solve the collective action problem.”). 
 54. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (expressing 
concern that a class action may “forc[e] . . . defendants to stake their companies on the outcome 
of a single jury trial, or . . . to settle even if they have no legal liability”); Milton Handler, The 
Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits—The Twenty-Third Annual 
Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971) (“[The class action device] utilizes the threat of 
unmanageable and expensive litigation to compel settlement . . . .”); Silver, supra note 52, at 
1357–58 (discussing Chief Judge Richard Posner and Judge Frank Easterbrook’s adoption of 
arguments similar to Professor Handler’s). 
 55. Gilles, supra note 16, at 396. 
 56. See, e.g., Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1218 (11th Cir. 2007) (reviewing 
Comcast’s class arbitration waiver, which provided that “[a]ll parties to the arbitration must be 
individually named” and that there was “no right or authority for any claims to be arbitrated or 
litigated on a class-action or consolidated basis”). 
 57. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[B]ecause the 
[agreement] creates a mandatory arbitration regime, a ban on class arbitration effectively 
forecloses the use of any class-based mechanism.”). 
 58. Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the 
Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 12 (2000). 
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economic loss to the consumer.59 Few consumers have the resources 
or desire to seek relief when filing fees, administrative costs, and 
attorneys’ fees exceed the potential award. As a result, consumers, no 
matter how strong their claims may be, are unable to assert those 
claims and must forgo any potential relief.60 Because class arbitration 
waivers leave consumers with otherwise valid claims without relief, 
the presumption that arbitration provides an effective dispute 
resolution procedure is erroneous.61 Opponents of class waivers argue 
that class proceedings avoid this inequitable result by aggregating the 
claims of many consumers, thereby lowering the costs faced by each.62 
A related and perhaps more serious problem with class 
arbitration waivers is that they potentially allow the drafting 
corporation’s misconduct to go unpunished.63 When individual 
consumers are unable to assert claims, companies are not held 
accountable for their misconduct.64 Recall, for instance, the story of 
Gene Dale and his fight to recover $10.56 from Comcast Cable.65 That 
amount, over a four-year period, may seem insignificant, but Comcast 
reaped nearly $640,000 as a result of its overcharging in Atlanta.66 If 
the class waiver precludes Dale and his fellow subscribers from 
recovering, Comcast has an incentive to continue overcharging, 
especially if it can recover such a large sum of money. But the class 
action device, by allowing individual consumers to aggregate their 
 
 59. See Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer 
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 75, 85–88 (Winter/Spring 2004) (discussing numerous cases in which the consumers’ 
potential award was significantly outweighed by the costs of asserting the claim). For example, 
one group of consumers was unable to assert a claim against a jewelry store that allegedly 
overcharged its customers by $8.46 because the store used a class waiver clause. State ex rel. 
Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 267 (W. Va. 2002). Professor Sternlight uses this and other 
cases to suggest that, without the aid of the class action device, many consumers will be left 
without adequate relief. Sternlight & Jensen, supra, at 86. 
 60. Leslie, supra note 53, at 76. 
 61. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1207 (Cal. 1982) (“If . . . an arbitration clause 
may be used to insulate the drafter of an adhesive contract from any form of class proceeding, 
effectively foreclosing many individual claims, it may well be oppressive and may defeat the 
expectations of the nondrafting party.”), rev’d in part sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 
U.S. 1 (1984). 
 62. Leslie, supra note 53, at 76. 
 63. Id. at 76–77. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See supra notes 5–13 and accompanying text. 
 66. Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1220 (11th Cir. 2007). 
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claims, increases the company’s liability, making its misconduct 
unprofitable.67 Because the class action procedure is in many instances 
necessary to deter business misconduct, consumer advocates argue 
that companies must be prevented from insulating themselves by 
using a class arbitration waiver.68 
C. Judicial Deference to Class Arbitration Waivers? 
The growth of class arbitration waivers and other remedy-
stripping provisions has meant more consumers challenging the 
viability of mandatory arbitration agreements. Although the Supreme 
Court has readily embraced arbitration and predispute arbitration 
agreements,69 it has also recognized limits to this judicial deference.70 
The Court has held that, though agreements to arbitrate are generally 
enforceable, a court may invalidate an arbitration agreement based 
on any common law contract defense, such as fraud or 
unconscionability.71 In consumer challenges to class waivers, many 
courts have used this authority to declare arbitration agreements (or 
at least the class waivers within those agreements) unenforceable. 
Courts generally rely on two doctrines to reach this result.72 Some 
courts apply state unconscionability analysis to invalidate class 
waivers. For instance, the Eleventh Circuit decided that Comcast’s 
class waiver, if enforced, would effectively preclude subscribers of 
Comcast cable from asserting low-value claims,73 “allow[ing] Comcast 
to engage in unchecked market behavior that may be unlawful.”74 
 
 67. Leslie, supra note 53, at 77. 
 68. E.g., Pub. Citizen, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Undermining the Rights of 
Consumers, Employees, and Small Businesses, http://www.citizen.org/congress/civjus/ 
arbitration/articles.cfm?ID=7332 (last visited Sept. 14, 2008) (“Class actions are the only 
effective remedy for wide-scale scams that rip off individual consumers . . . in small amounts.”). 
 69. See supra notes 37–47 and accompanying text. 
 70. E.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 
(1985) (“Of course, courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement 
to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would 
provide grounds ‘for the revocation of any contract.’” (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2)). 
 71. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 n.11 (1984). 
 72. See Gilles, supra note 16, at 399–400, 406–08 (describing two waves of challenges to 
class arbitration waivers). 
 73. Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007); see also supra note 12 and 
accompanying text. 
 74. Dale, 498 F.3d at 1224. 
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Thus, the court held that the class waiver was unconscionable.75 The 
Ninth Circuit, also relying on unconscionability analysis, reached a 
similar result in Ting v. AT&T.76 Other courts have held that class 
arbitration waivers preclude consumers from vindicating their federal 
statutory rights.77 The First Circuit, for example, noted that the 
presumption that arbitration is an adequate mechanism for resolving 
disputes fails when a consumer faces large arbitration costs.78 The 
court held that because the class arbitration waiver at hand 
significantly increased the costs faced by consumers, many plaintiffs 
were left unable to vindicate their statutory rights.79 As a result, the 
clause was unenforceable.80 
The problem for consumers is that a majority of jurisdictions 
have reached a different conclusion. The First,81 Third,82 Fourth,83 
Fifth,84 and Seventh85 Circuits each enforce class waivers, at least in 
certain circumstances.86 These courts generally point to both the 
federal policy favoring arbitration and the FAA’s mandate that an 
arbitration agreement be enforced in accordance with its terms when 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that AT&T’s class 
waiver was unconscionable because it was unfairly one-sided). 
 77. See, e.g., Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that 
Comcast’s class arbitration waiver would leave plaintiffs unable to vindicate their statutory 
rights); Chun Wing Wong v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05-73922, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49444, at 
*12–13 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2006) (“Plaintiff’s damages are a paltry $19.74, hardly enough to 
make arbitration worthwhile. Class actions were designed for situations just like this. 
The . . . class action mechanism is essential to the effective vindication [of the plaintiff’s] 
statutory cause of action.”).  
 78. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 54–55. 
 79. Id. at 61. 
 80. Id. at 64. 
 81. Anderson v. Comcast Corp., 500 F.3d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 2007) (upholding a class waiver 
clause). 
 82. Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 374–75 (3d Cir. 2000) (same). 
 83. Snowden v. Checkpoint Check Cashing, 290 F.3d 631, 638 (4th Cir. 2002) (same). 
 84. Iberia Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 379 F.3d 159, 175 (5th Cir. 2004) 
(same). 
 85. Livingston v. Assocs. Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 559 (7th Cir. 2003) (same). 
 86. No court has held that all class waiver clauses are enforceable. Rather, each circuit has 
engaged in a contract-by-contract analysis and made a determination based upon the facts of 
each case. The First Circuit, for instance, invalidated Comcast’s arbitration agreement on one 
occasion, Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 61 (1st Cir. 2006), and enforced it on another, 
Anderson, 500 F.3d at 72. 
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upholding class waivers.87 Moreover, with few exceptions, most state 
courts consider class waivers enforceable as well.88 Finally, some state 
legislatures have taken it on themselves to declare class waivers 
enforceable. In Utah, for example, creditors may include class 
arbitration waivers within consumer credit contracts.89 It appears, 
therefore, that in the majority of jurisdictions, courts will enforce class 
waivers against consumers. 
Although the Supreme Court has yet to decide the issue, there is 
evidence that some members of the Roberts Court consider class 
arbitration waivers enforceable. In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. 
Bazzle,90 the Court faced an arbitration agreement that was 
ambiguous as to whether or not class arbitration was precluded.91 The 
plurality declared that when an arbitration agreement is ambiguous 
regarding the availability of class arbitration, an arbitrator, as 
opposed to a court, should interpret the agreement.92 Though the 
plurality did not state that class waivers are enforceable, the decision 
suggests that a business may include such a waiver in its arbitration 
agreement. Otherwise, the plurality would have simply invalidated 
the class waiver—there would have been no reason to require the 
arbitrator to determine whether or not a contract contains a class 
waiver. Indeed, Justice Stevens, who concurred in the plurality’s 
judgment,93 opined during oral arguments in the case that, whatever 
decision the Court reached, “all the arbitration agreements in the 
future will prohibit class actions.”94 Coupled with the judicial and 
legislative traction they have already gained, Bazzle suggests a bright 
future for class arbitration waivers. 
 
 87. See, e.g., Johnson, 225 F.3d at 369 (explaining that the FAA and the federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements impose a heavy burden upon challenging consumers). 
 88. See Gilles, supra note 16, at 401 (describing California as the only state that regularly 
finds class arbitration waivers unenforceable). Though California is still in the minority position, 
it is no longer alone. See, e.g., Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250, 278 (Ill. 2006) 
(severing a class arbitration waiver from a consumer arbitration agreement). 
 89. UTAH CODE ANN. § 70C-4-105 (Supp. 2007). 
 90. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (plurality opinion). 
 91. Id. at 451. 
 92. Id. at 453. 
 93. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 94. Transcript of Oral Argument at 55, Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (No. 02-634), 2003 WL 
1989562. 
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II.  HOW CONSUMER ADVOCATES HAVE RESPONDED TO THE 
PROLIFERATION OF CLASS ARBITRATION WAIVERS 
Commentators have given class waivers significant attention 
since businesses first began limiting consumers’ ability to assert 
consolidated claims within arbitration.95 Nonetheless, courts mostly 
have rejected arguments that class waivers should be held 
unenforceable.96 And though judicial attitudes may change, there are 
few indications that consumers will fare better in the near future.97 As 
a result, attention should shift from criticism to reform. 
Consumer advocates, however, have yet to put forth an adequate 
solution to the problems presented by class waivers. Whereas their 
critiques are extensive, weighing the costs of class waivers against any 
potential benefits and examining at length the likely implications on 
consumers, scholars’ proposed resolutions have been far less 
complete. Of the commentators who have proposed solutions, most 
have concluded that legislation barring the use of class waivers is the 
best, and perhaps only, solution.98 
For example, consider the critiques offered by Professors Jean 
Sternlight and Elizabeth Jensen. Professors Sternlight and Jensen 
examine class waivers from public policy and efficiency perspectives.99 
They first address the argument that class arbitration waivers, 
because they lower the costs faced by companies when resolving 
disputes, actually benefit consumers because companies are able to 
pass these savings to consumers by providing lower priced goods.100 
Sternlight and Jensen demonstrate that this argument is incomplete 
using economic analysis that shows that consumers are unlikely to 
 
 95. See supra notes 58–68 and accompanying text. 
 96. See supra Part I.C. 
 97. See Gilles, supra note 16, at 375, 428 (concluding that class waiver clauses may 
ultimately lead to the demise of the class action in part because “courts are likely to prove 
hospitable to collective action waivers for as far as the eye can see”). 
 98. See, e.g., id. at 428 (explaining that, if courts continue to uphold arbitration agreements 
containing class waiver clauses, legislation preventing companies from barring the use of 
consolidated claims may be necessary). 
 99. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 59, at 92–99. 
 100. Id. at 92–93. Proponents of this argument suggest that subjecting businesses to class 
arbitration will harm consumers because companies will raise prices to offset the higher dispute-
resolution costs. See, e.g., Steven J. Ware, Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of 
Consumer Arbitration Agreements, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 89, 90 (contending that arbitration 
lowers a business’s “dispute-resolution costs” in part because of the ability to avoid class 
actions). 
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benefit from mandatory arbitration agreements and remedy-stripping 
provisions such as class waivers.101 They then argue that even if class 
waivers enabled companies to lower the price of consumer goods, 
these provisions should not be enforced for public policy reasons.102 
Consumers tend to be overly optimistic, meaning that many would 
gladly trade their ability to assert claims on a consolidated basis for 
lower priced goods even though that right is potentially worth 
significantly more than the difference in price.103 Further, Sternlight 
and Jensen contend that class waivers should not be permitted 
because of the important role of private litigation in the United 
States.104 Eliminating consumers’ ability to consolidate claims would 
pose a significant problem in a legal system that does not rely on 
administrative enforcement to protect consumers.105 
Having concluded that businesses should not be able to use class 
waivers to prevent consumers from asserting consolidated claims, 
Professors Sternlight and Jensen argue that regulation is necessary.106 
Consumers can protect themselves from class waivers only by 
litigating the matter in court.107 Although this case-by-case approach 
has enabled some consumers to successfully challenge class waivers,108 
this approach unfairly places a heavy burden on the consumer, who 
has to spend a significant amount of money to challenge the 
arbitration agreement.109 Courts’ contract-by-contract analysis forces 
many consumers to forgo their challenges as economically 
unfeasible.110 
Professors Sternlight and Jensen next examine how to best 
regulate the use of class waivers. This is where their argument—and 
many similar scholarly critiques of class waivers—falls short. They 
conclude: 
 
 101. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 59, at 94–95. 
 102. Id. at 96–99. 
 103. Id. at 97. 
 104. Id. at 98–99. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 99. 
 107. Id. 
 108. For a discussion of various circuit courts’ treatment of class waiver clauses, see supra 
notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
 109. Sternlight & Jensen, supra note 59, at 100–01. 
 110. Id. 
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An alternative to using a case-by-case approach would be for 
Congress to prohibit companies from using arbitration clauses to 
preclude class actions. If Congress thought such a general 
prohibition too broad, it could at least prohibit the practice with 
respect to arbitration agreements imposed on consumers or 
employees. Such a legislative approach would have both costs and 
benefits. Its primary advantage would be substantially reducing the 
cost of challenging class action prohibitions, but it would also serve 
other interests that are furthered by class actions, including the 
courts’ interest in the efficient resolution of disputes and the public’s 
interest in ensuring that the law is enforced.111 
Other than noting that states could adopt similar legislation,112 the 
above quote is the article’s entire discussion of potential remedies. 
Although the purpose of Professors Sternlight’s and Jensen’s 
article was to shed light on the problems associated with class waivers 
as opposed to identifying potential solutions, too many scholarly 
critiques have concluded in the same casual manner.113 Commentators 
have yet to examine the likely implications of legislation barring use 
of class waivers. In short, their critiques have thus far failed to 
adequately focus on a sufficient response to the problems presented 
by class waivers. 
III.  WHY LEGISLATION BARRING THE USE OF CLASS ARBITRATION 
WAIVERS IS AN INSUFFICIENT REMEDY 
Legislation preventing businesses from including class waivers 
within their arbitration agreements seems both a sensible and 
effective solution. Thus it is no surprise that many commentators have 
reached this result.114 Because consumers are unjustly prevented from 
asserting claims on a class basis, a reasonable solution should allow 
 
 111. Id. at 101–02 (footnote omitted). 
 112. Id. at 102. 
 113. See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 16, at 428 (“Congress . . . could pass legislation providing 
that the procedures of Rule 23 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] may not be 
waived . . . .”); Sternlight, supra note 58, at 121 (“Legislation will be needed to prevent 
companies from using binding arbitration clauses to eliminate class actions entirely, to the 
extent we decide it would be undesirable to allow companies to insulate themselves from class 
actions . . . .”); Thomas Burch, Note, Necessity Never Made a Good Bargain: When Consumer 
Arbitration Agreements Prohibit Class Relief, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1005, 1040 (2004) (“[O]ne 
practical compromise would be to uphold the parties’ agreement to arbitrate, but allow state law 
to determine whether the arbitration may proceed on a classwide basis.”). 
 114. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text. 
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consolidated claims within arbitration. Legislation preventing 
companies from using class waivers, the argument goes, would allow 
consumers to consolidate their claims. As a result, low-value 
claimants are able to seek relief, regardless of the amount of their 
claims. 
The problem with this argument is that it makes a number of 
questionable assumptions. First, commentators assume that allowing 
class claims in arbitration would provide consumers sufficient relief 
while adequately protecting the rights of the parties involved. Second, 
the argument assumes that businesses would continue to use 
arbitration if consumers could consolidate their claims. This Part 
concludes that class arbitration rules sacrifice important party rights 
and that businesses may no longer use arbitration if subject to class 
claims. Legislation prohibiting class waivers is therefore an 
inadequate solution. 
A. Will Legislators Answer Calls for Legislative Reform? 
Assuming Congress or various state legislatures agreed that they 
should eliminate class arbitration waivers, what steps could legislators 
take toward a remedy? The Federal Arbitration Act presents a 
significant hurdle to state legislation attempting to ban such clauses. 
Section 2 of the FAA provides that written agreements to arbitrate 
are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.115 The Supreme Court has held 
that the FAA preempts any state law, whether legislatively or 
judicially created, that suggests otherwise.116 Therefore, courts would 
likely hold that federal law preempts any state legislation providing 
consumers with a right to class arbitration or prohibiting companies 
from including waiver clauses in arbitration agreements.117 Although 
determining exactly when federal law would preempt state legislation 
is beyond the scope of this Note, courts would probably invalidate the 
type of state legislation that critics of class arbitration waivers 
recommend. 
 
 115. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 116. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], 
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to 
require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to 
resolve by arbitration.”); see also Robert S. Safi, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Preserving the 
Class Mechanism Under State Law in the Era of Consumer Arbitration, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1715, 
1721–24 (2005) (discussing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA’s preemptive effect). 
 117. Safi, supra note 116, at 1736. 
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As for congressional action, Congress could amend the FAA to 
prohibit class waivers. Congress could add a provision preventing 
drafters from including class waivers within their arbitration 
agreements or one declaring any such clause unenforceable. Such a 
practical solution is unlikely; in the nearly two decades since 
mandatory arbitration agreements emerged, Congress has yet to offer 
consumers any form of protection.118 
In short, legislative reform is a possibility. State legislatures may 
find a way to draft a statute so as to prohibit class arbitration waivers 
without running afoul of the FAA. Congress might finally decide to 
provide consumers relief from mandatory arbitration by prohibiting 
waiver clauses in consumer contracts, at least in some circumstances. 
But critics of these waivers have failed to recognize that the efficacy 
of such reforms is outweighed by the remote possibility of their 
enactment and enforcement. 
B. Class Arbitration: A Flawed Procedure 
Putting aside whether legislative reform is a possibility, it is not 
at all clear that Congress could prohibit class arbitration waivers 
without creating other, perhaps more serious, problems. Legislation 
declaring these clauses unenforceable would have its benefits. This 
bright-line approach would allow courts to avoid difficult, time-
consuming contract-by-contract analysis. Nonetheless, legislative 
reform is an insufficient solution, primarily because it relies too much 
on class arbitration to resolve consumer claims. 
Though commentators blame class waivers for unjustly stripping 
consumers of the ability to assert low-value claims, it is important to 
note that these clauses foreclose only class arbitration. The 
arbitration agreement itself, not the class waiver, prohibits class 
action litigation (or any other court litigation).119 In other words, 
consumers’ inability to bring low-value claims is the product of two 
steps: first, the arbitration agreement, by forcing the consumer into 
arbitration, prevents the consumer from participating in class action 
 
 118. See id. at 1717 & n.11 (discussing several unsuccessful attempts in Congress to protect 
consumers from mandatory arbitration agreements). 
 119. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 54 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[T]he [agreement] 
explicitly forbids only class arbitration, and not class actions. However, because the [agreement] 
creates a mandatory arbitration regime, a ban on class arbitration effectively forecloses the use 
of any class-based mechanism.”). 
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litigation; second, the class waivers within the arbitration agreement 
prevent the consumer from participating in class arbitration. The 
distinction, though subtle, is important because legislative reform 
rendering class arbitration waivers unenforceable would allow 
consumers to take advantage only of class arbitration. So long as 
companies continued to use arbitration agreements despite legislative 
reform, class action litigation would remain unavailable to consumers 
subject to a valid arbitration agreement. Therefore, the success of 
legislative reform ultimately depends on the viability of class 
arbitration as a dispute mechanism.120 
It is this reliance on class arbitration that dooms legislative 
reform as a viable option. Though courts first recognized class 
arbitration as a potential solution to the problem of mandatory 
arbitration over twenty-five years ago,121 class arbitration is a 
relatively untested device.122 Opponents of class waivers assume that 
making class arbitration available to consumers would effectively 
 
 120. Professor Sternlight has suggested that legislation might instead preclude both class 
waiver clauses and class arbitration. Sternlight, supra note 58, at 125. Consumers would then be 
able to use traditional class action litigation for class claims but would be required to arbitrate 
any individual claims. Id. This approach, however, forces many claims that might otherwise be 
resolved through arbitration into courtrooms. The federal policy favoring arbitration requires 
courts to uphold parties’ commitments to arbitration. See Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 
1192, 1207 (Cal. 1982) (“One possible solution to this dilemma would be to hold that arbitration 
agreements contained in contracts of adhesion may not operate to stay properly maintainable 
class actions. The statutes and public policy supportive of arbitration require, however, that this 
result be avoided if means are available to give expression to the basic arbitration commitment 
of the parties.” (citations omitted)), rev’d in part sub nom. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 
1 (1984). 
 121. See, e.g., Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209 (“Where . . . gross unfairness would result from the 
denial of opportunity to proceed on a classwide basis, then an order structuring arbitration on 
that basis would be justified.”). 
 122. See Joshua S. Lipshutz, Note, The Court’s Implicit Roadmap: Charting the Prudent 
Course at the Juncture of Mandatory Arbitration Agreements and Class Action Lawsuits, 57 
STAN. L. REV. 1677, 1717 (2005) (“[T]here have been no special class arbitration procedures 
devised by Congress via the FAA or any other legislation.”). Indeed, during oral arguments in 
Bazzle, Justice Ginsburg inquired whether there had ever been a class arbitration proceeding, 
and counsel for Green Tree could identify only a few. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 
94, at 13. Since the Bazzle decision, however, the prevalence of class arbitration has increased. 
The American Arbitration Association, one of the leading arbitration providers in the United 
States, has administered over one hundred class arbitrations. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Class 
Action Cases, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last visited Sept. 14, 2008) (listing all class 
arbitration proceedings AAA has administered or is currently administering). 
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solve the problems presented by the clauses.123 Evaluation of class 
arbitration, however, shows that assumption is at least premature and 
likely misguided. Simply put, class arbitration is not capable of 
resolving hundreds (perhaps thousands) of claims, all the while 
adequately protecting the interests of absent class members and the 
defendants. Moreover, increased use of class arbitration might 
ultimately lead businesses to avoid using arbitration agreements 
altogether, a result at odds with the United States’s “federal policy 
favoring arbitration.”124 
1. Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Class Arbitration 
Rules Fail to Protect Consumers Asserting Class Claims.  Following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Bazzle,125 several major private 
arbitration providers set forth rules governing use of class arbitration. 
For example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA), a 
private alternative dispute resolution provider, adopted its 
Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitrations just months after the 
Bazzle decision.126 The AAA and other arbitration providers used 
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as a model.127 In many 
respects, the arbitration providers’ rules are identical to Rule 23.128 
 
 123. See Sternlight, supra note 58, at 121–22 (contending that legislation precluding use of 
class arbitration waivers would “allow[] suits to be brought by small claimants who otherwise 
could not afford to sue” and “facilitate[] enforcement of laws”). 
 124. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 125. See supra notes 90–94 and accompanying text (discussing Bazzle and its implications). 
 126. See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations (July 14, 2005), 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28779 (explaining that the AAA’s rules were adopted in response 
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Bazzle). 
 127. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (setting forth several prerequisites to a class action, 
describing the types of class actions maintainable, and presenting numerous procedural 
protections for the parties to a class action), with JUDICIAL ARBITRATION & MEDIATION 
SERVS. (JAMS), JAMS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURES 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/JAMS_Class_Action_Procedures.pdf (adopting similar 
prerequisites and procedural protections and describing similar types of classes maintainable in 
class arbitration), and SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS § 4(a) (Am. 
Arbitration Ass’n 2003), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=21936 (same). 
 128. For instance, JAMS, a large private arbitration and mediation provider, requires that a 
class meet four prerequisites before it may be certified: the class must be “so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable”; there must be “questions of law or fact common to the 
class”; “the claims or defenses of the representative parties [must be] typical of the claims or 
defenses of the class”; and “the representative parties [must] fairly and adequately protect the 
interests of the class.” JAMS, supra note 127, at 2. These requirements are identical to the 
prerequisites set forth in Rule 23(a). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (describing the prerequisites to a 
class action). 
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Regarding many important issues, however, the rules are either silent 
or diverge significantly from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
raising serious questions as to the ability of class arbitration to 
adequately resolve disputes. Though there are other examples,129 this 
Section considers one—appellate review of certification decisions—at 
length. 
In 1998, the Supreme Court adopted Rule 23(f), which provides 
the federal courts of appeals discretionary interlocutory review of a 
lower court’s decision granting or denying class certification.130 That 
rule was enacted in large part because of the significant impact a class 
certification decision can have on the losing party.131 Before its 
adoption, litigants dissatisfied with a lower court’s certification ruling 
were generally barred from interlocutory review.132 In many instances, 
however, the certification decision was dispositive of the claim: a 
decision denying certification of a class action could serve as a death 
knell to the plaintiffs’ claim,133 whereas an order granting certification 
imposed significant pressure on the defendant to settle.134 The 
Advisory Committee believed that, because of these concerns, 
interlocutory appeal should be available in limited situations.135 
 
 129. The rules governing discovery provide one example. The Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure generally do not limit defendants to deposing only the plaintiff. Instead, Rule 30 
provides that the defendant may depose “any person.” FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(1) (emphasis 
added). Though some courts have limited discovery in class actions, see, e.g., Cox v. Am. Cast 
Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1556–57 (1986) (precluding the defendant from pursuing discovery 
from absent class members), class action litigation defendants are able to discover substantially 
more than are class arbitration defendants. Class arbitration providers substantially limit the 
ability of parties to gather information. For instance, JAMS allows parties to depose only one 
person. JAMS, COMPREHENSIVE ARBITRATION RULES & PROCEDURES 8–9 (2007), available 
at http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/JAMS-comprehensive_arbitration_rules.pdf. It is not at 
all clear how a company could defend a class arbitration suit while deposing only one person. 
 130. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f). 
 131. See id. advisory committee’s note (discussing the concerns which led to Rule 23(f)’s 
enactment); see also Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class 
Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of Appeals Under Rule 
23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1552 (2000) (discussing the “potential significance of an 
adverse class certification decision”). 
 132. See Solimine & Hines, supra note 131, at 1562 (discussing support for allowing 
immediate appeal of class action certification decisions). 
 133. Id. at 1552. 
 134. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f) advisory committee’s note (“An order granting 
certification . . . may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class 
action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.”). 
 135. Id. Courts generally consider appellate review appropriate in three situations: when 
“denial of class status sounds the death knell of the litigation,” when “grant of class 
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To provide consumers and businesses similar protection in class 
arbitration proceedings, many arbitration providers incorporate the 
right to interlocutory appeal provided for in Rule 23(f).136 The 
problem, however, is that the rules fail to acknowledge the FAA’s 
severe limitation on a court’s ability to modify an arbitral decision. 
The FAA provides that arbitral decisions may be vacated only in a 
limited number of circumstances, most importantly “where the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them 
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter 
submitted was not made.”137 Courts have interpreted this limitation as 
equivalent to a “manifest disregard of the law” standard,138 meaning 
that a court may vacate an arbitral decision only when the arbitrator 
was aware of the governing legal principle but failed to apply it, and 
the particular law ignored by the arbitrator was explicit and clearly 
applicable.139 Lower court decisions granting or denying certification, 
on the other hand, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion, which 
permits reversal if the lower court’s decision was based “upon a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an 
improper application of law to fact.”140 A dissatisfied party in an 
 
status . . . put[s] considerable pressure on the defendant to settle,” and when “an appeal may 
facilitate the development of the law.” Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834–35 
(7th Cir. 1999). 
 136. See, e.g., JAMS, supra note 127, at 3 (“In the discretion of the Arbitrator, his or her 
determinations with respect to the matter of Class Certification may be set forth in a partial 
final award subject to immediate court review.”). Others provide a right to appeal only after the 
class arbitration award has been issued, however. See, e.g., SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS 
ARBITRATIONS, supra note 127, § 5(d) (“The arbitrator shall stay all proceedings following the 
issuance of the Class Determination Award for a period of at least 30 days to permit any party 
to move a court of competent jurisdiction to confirm or to vacate the Class Determination 
Award.”). 
 137. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006). 
 138. E.g., Collins v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[W]e have 
adopted a narrow ‘manifest disregard of the law’ exception under which a procedurally proper 
arbitration award may be vacated.”); Major League Umpires Ass’n v. Am. League of Prof’l 
Baseball Clubs, 357 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[A]n award may be vacated if the arbitrator 
demonstrates manifest disregard for the [law].”); Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 
202 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A]n arbitration award may be vacated if it is in ‘manifest disregard of the 
law.”). 
 139. Halligan, 148 F.3d at 202. For a detailed analysis and critique of the manifest disregard 
of the law standard as applied to arbitral decisions, see Michael A. Scodro, Deterrence and 
Implied Limits on Arbitral Power, 55 DUKE L.J. 547, 565–87 (2005). 
 140. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 
(1995)). 
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arbitration proceeding therefore faces a much higher burden than a 
dissatisfied court litigant, because a manifest disregard of the law 
“means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the 
law.”141 
The result seems inconsistent with the presumption that 
arbitration adequately and fairly enforces the parties’ rights. To 
illustrate, suppose two separate, yet identical, class actions are filed 
against two different cell phone providers. One class files a class 
action in a United States district court (because that cell phone 
provider does not use mandatory arbitration agreements), whereas 
the other class, because of a mandatory arbitration agreement, is 
forced to use class arbitration. Suppose both the lower court and the 
arbitrator misinterpret the applicable law and therefore 
inappropriately certify the proposed classes. Under the abuse of 
discretion standard, the appellate court can overturn the lower court’s 
“errant conclusion of law.”142 But under the manifest disregard of the 
law standard, the arbitrator must have committed more than mere 
error or misunderstanding.143 Under these circumstances, it appears 
that a court could not modify the arbitrator’s decision, despite the 
arbitration providers’ rules suggesting otherwise. 
That identical classes achieve different results merely because 
one party files suit in court whereas the other is relegated to 
arbitration is manifestly unfair and should raise serious concerns 
regarding the ability of class arbitration to protect the parties to a 
dispute. Some might argue that this result is a problem of arbitration 
in general, because the manifest disregard of the law standard applies 
to all arbitration decisions, not just those granting or denying class 
certification.144 Although that may be the case, the problem is both 
more apparent and more severe in the context of class arbitration, 
given the broader impact of certification decisions. Though 
arbitration providers appear to have recognized and addressed this 
concern by granting the right to interlocutory appeal, the Rule 23(f)–
 
 141. Halligan, 148 F.3d at 202 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 
808 F.2d 930, 933 (2nd Cir. 1986)). 
 142. Newton, 259 F.3d at 165 (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank, 
55 F.3d at 783). 
 143. Halligan, 148 F.3d at 202. 
 144. See generally Scodro, supra note 139 (examining the manifest disregard of the law 
standard at length and offering a more appropriate alternative). 
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like provisions fail to address the impact of the manifest disregard of 
the law standard. 
2. The Class Arbitration Rules Fail to Protect the Rights of the 
Parties Involved.  The previous Section identified procedural 
inadequacies of class arbitration proceedings and explained that, 
although the arbitration providers’ rules appear to mimic those set 
forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the rules governing 
class arbitration fail to take into consideration the unique 
characteristics of arbitration as set forth in the FAA. These and other 
deficiencies raise significant due process concerns. Though it is well 
settled that the Due Process Clause does not apply to private 
arbitration,145 the rise of class arbitration has led several 
commentators to reexamine whether due process might actually play 
a role in a limited number of arbitration proceedings.146 For instance, 
in class arbitrations provided by JAMS, an arbitrator is permitted to 
make a partial final award subject to immediate court review.147 Such 
judicial involvement would apparently bring into play due process 
considerations. Some therefore suggest that private arbitration 
providers’ class arbitration procedures are subject to due process 
requirements.148 Others believe that, regardless of the Due Process 
Clause’s applicability to arbitration, AAA, JAMS, and other 
arbitration providers must afford class members and defendants 
 
 145. See, e.g., Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he state 
action element of a due process claim is absent in private arbitration cases.”); Fed. Deposit Ins. 
Corp. v. Air Florida Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[W]e do not find in private 
arbitration proceedings the state action requisite for a constitutional due process claim.”); 
Elmore v. Chi. & Ill. Midland Ry. Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir. 1986) (“[T]he fact that a private 
arbitrator denies the procedural safeguards that are encompassed by the term ‘due process of 
law’ cannot give rise to a constitutional complaint.”). 
 146. See, e.g., Carole J. Buckner, Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 239 
(2006) (“Provider models of class arbitration also may involve state action . . . given that the role 
of the court in class arbitration is increased beyond that involved in non-class arbitration, and 
that judicial review of an arbitrator’s certification decisions potentially available under provider 
models occurs in connection with a potential area of deprivation of constitutional rights.”); The 
Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 410, 418–19 (2003) (“Although 
private arbitration is not generally subject to due process constraints because it does not involve 
state action, binding absent class members to an arbitrator’s judgment would likely implicate 
due process requirements of adequate notice and representation.” (footnote omitted)). 
 147. JAMS, supra note 127, at 2. 
 148. See, e.g., Buckner, supra note 146, at 247 (suggesting that, because an arbitrator cannot 
be certain whether there will be judicial involvement during an arbitration proceeding, 
arbitration providers’ rules should satisfy due process requirements). 
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adequate due process protections.149 Arbitration providers apparently 
agree, as many have self-imposed “due process protocols.”150 Before 
legislators declare class arbitration waivers unenforceable, they 
should be satisfied that class members receive adequate notice and 
are adequately represented. Again, in many respects, the arbitration 
providers’ rules fail to provide general fairness to the parties involved. 
Selecting the arbitrator presents one potential problem. The right 
to have a dispute resolved by a neutral decisionmaker is fundamental 
to due process.151 Courts generally consider the neutrality of the 
arbitrator an important factor when determining whether arbitration 
agreements adequately protect the nondrafting party.152 To guarantee 
their arbitrators’ neutrality, arbitration providers allow the parties to 
a dispute to participate in selecting the arbitrator.153 In a proceeding 
between an individual consumer and a company, these provisions 
guarantee the arbitrator’s neutrality, or at least give consumers the 
opportunity to protect themselves against a biased arbitrator, because 
the consumer or the consumer’s attorney directly participates in the 
selection process. But in a class proceeding, the arbitrator must be 
selected before class certification, because it is the arbitrator’s job to 
certify the class.154 As a result, class members are unable to participate 
in the selection process, and there is no way for these members to 
protect themselves against a biased arbitrator. Although the 
requirement that the class representative adequately represent the 
class members might provide some form of protection, that 
requirement is insufficient.155 Because the class members have a right 
 
 149. See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of 
Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1766–67 (2006) (“Even if courts reject 
mandating constitutional due process in class arbitrations through the state action doctrine, the 
concerns for a fair process in class arbitrations are as significant, if not more, as they are in 
judicial class actions . . . .”). 
 150. Sternlight, supra note 18, at 172. 
 151. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 727 (1992). 
 152. See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (enforcing an 
arbitral decision in part because the agreement provided for neutral arbitrators). 
 153. See, e.g., JAMS, JAMS POLICY ON CONSUMER ARBITRATIONS PURSUANT TO PRE-
DISPUTE CLAUSES: MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.jamsadr.com/images/PDF/Consumer_Arbitration_Min_Std.pdf (“The arbitrator(s) 
must be neutral and the consumer must have a reasonable opportunity to participate in the 
process of choosing the arbitrator(s).”). 
 154. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003). 
 155. At that stage in the proceedings, there are no class members or even putative class 
members to protect. An individual consumer (who may eventually become the class 
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to an unbiased decisionmaker, and that right is protected in the 
arbitration context by allowing the parties to choose the arbitrator, 
class members who are bound by the ruling of an arbitrator they were 
prevented from selecting are not protected against unfair rulings.156 
A similar problem concerns the class members’ near inability to 
challenge the arbitrator’s determination that the class representatives 
adequately represent the class. A class action judgment binds absent 
class members only when those members have been adequately 
represented.157 In a typical class action proceeding, absent class 
members are given numerous opportunities to ensure the adequacy of 
the representatives. For instance, Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure provides absent class members the ability to appeal 
immediately a district court’s order granting or denying class 
certification.158 Moreover, when it becomes apparent that the 
representative is inadequate after certification, some courts allow 
class members to collaterally attack the district court’s adequacy 
finding.159 
These same protections are not available in the class arbitration 
setting. First, the strict manifest disregard of the law standard 
 
representative) might select a particular arbitrator with the best of intentions, believing that the 
arbitrator is neutral. But if for some reason the arbitrator is biased against the class, the class 
members have few ways to replace the biased arbitrator. The only remedies available are to (1) 
complain to the very arbitrator they are accusing of bias or (2) seek an interlocutory appeal by 
demonstrating that there was a manifest disregard of the law, neither of which seems very 
promising. 
 156. Although the above text concentrates on the class members’ right to a neutral 
arbitrator, defendant companies share that right as well. When an individual consumer and a 
company mutually select an arbitrator, both parties are able to adequately protect themselves. 
But what if the defendant would have chosen a different arbitrator with respect to other class 
members? In such a case, the defendant company will be bound by the decision of an arbitrator 
it played no role in selecting, which raises questions about class arbitration’s ability to 
adequately protect the defendant. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 459 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) 
(noting that, because parties to an arbitration agreement are entitled to select their own 
arbitrator, subjecting a defendant to the ruling of a single arbitrator with respect to every class 
member’s claim is a violation of the defendant’s rights). 
 157. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940). 
 158. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f); see also supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text. 
 159. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Dow Chem. Co., 273 F.3d 249, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2001) (allowing 
absent class members to attack the adequacy of representation collaterally even after 
termination of the suit), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 539 U.S. 111, 112 (2003) (per curiam); 
Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67, 72 (5th Cir. 1973) (same). But see, e.g., Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 
179 F.3d 641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Simply put, the absent class members’ due process right to 
adequate representation is protected not by collateral review, but by the certifying court 
initially . . . .”). 
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prevents many class members from appealing the arbitrator’s initial 
certification decision.160 Moreover, when the class representative’s 
inadequacy becomes apparent after the certification decision, the 
class members’ only available remedy is to appeal the arbitrator’s 
final award. The manifest disregard of the law standard also precludes 
many appeals challenging the class representative’s adequacy. As a 
result, in class arbitration, class members can ensure adequate 
representation only by objecting during the certification phase. This 
result suggests that the adequacy of representation may present a 
greater concern in class arbitration than in class action litigation. 
Finally, many arbitration providers have yet to set forth any 
provisions that safeguard the consumers’ due process rights.161 Despite 
some shortcomings, JAMS’s class arbitration rules at least offer class 
members adequate notice162 and opt-out rights.163 Other arbitration 
providers, however, such as the National Arbitration Forum (NAF), 
have no rules governing class arbitration.164 It is difficult to imagine 
how a legislative response prohibiting use of class arbitration waivers 
could succeed when some important arbitration providers have yet to 
develop procedures which facilitate class arbitration. 
3. The Availability of Class Arbitration May Lead Companies to 
Avoid Using Arbitration Altogether.  If Congress did amend the FAA 
to prohibit use of class arbitration waivers, companies would be left 
with a choice. They could continue to use arbitration agreements with 
their consumers, subjecting themselves to potential class arbitration. 
Or they could forgo use of arbitration agreements entirely, opting 
instead to resolve disputes through traditional litigation and 
therefore, when courts find certification appropriate, the traditional 
class action. Section B assumes that companies would continue using 
arbitration even in the absence of class arbitration waivers. This is a 
questionable, and possibly erroneous, assumption. Class arbitration is 
 
 160. For a discussion of the manifest disregard of the law standard and its implications for 
class arbitration, see supra notes 136–43 and accompanying text. 
 161. See Buckner, supra note 146, at 249 (noting that only AAA and JAMS have chosen to 
provide due process-like protections to class members). 
 162. See JAMS, supra note 127, at 3 (mirroring Rule 23(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and its notice provisions). 
 163. Id. (permitting class members to exclude themselves from the proceeding). 
 164. Sternlight, supra note 58, at 72. Professor Sternlight suggests that NAF actually uses 
this fact to market itself to companies typically involved in consumer arbitration proceedings. 
Id. 
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a relatively new procedure, which, coupled with the fact that a 
company rarely can appeal an arbitrator’s decision, suggests a high 
degree of unpredictability.165 Furthermore, some commentators 
suggest that exposing companies to class arbitration would increase 
the costs of resolving disputes when compared to the costs of 
individual arbitration.166 At some point, companies may decide to 
avoid arbitration altogether if the cost increases are significant, given 
that a primary reason for arbitration is to avoid high litigation 
expenditures.167 In light of these concerns, some companies have 
amended their agreements to avoid arbitration altogether if they are 
unable to compel arbitration on an individual basis.168 
For opponents of class waivers, this might seem like a favorable 
result. Consumers would no longer be precluded from using 
traditional litigation to resolve disputes. But Congress has declared a 
national policy favoring arbitration.169 This national policy arose from 
concerns that the legal system, characterized by high costs and 
lengthy delays, was incapable of efficiently and adequately resolving 
disputes.170 Arbitration and other alternative dispute mechanisms 
have helped ease this burden.171 Legislative action, by forcing 
companies to engage in class arbitration, may very well force 
countless consumer claims, many of which could have been 
successfully resolved without exhausting limited judicial resources, 
from arbitration to the courtroom. A successful solution to class 
 
 165. See id. at 118 (noting that companies may prefer “the known quantity of class action 
litigation, rather than risk a bad experience with the relatively unknown” class arbitration 
process). 
 166. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 100, at 90 (maintaining that arbitration and the clauses 
typically included within arbitration agreements result in lower-priced consumer goods). 
 167. For an explanation of the reasons for widespread use of arbitration, see supra note 23 
and accompanying text. 
 168. Jack Wilson, ‘No-Class-Action Arbitration Clauses,’ State-Law Unconscionability, and 
the Federal Arbitration Act: A Case for Federal Judicial Restraint and Congressional Action, 23 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 737, 779–80 (2004). 
 169. For a description of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FAA and the policy in 
favor of arbitration, see supra notes 37–47 and accompanying text. 
 170. For the suggestion that litigation’s inefficiency gave rise to judicial acceptance of 
arbitration, see supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 171. Raymond J. Broderick, Compulsory Arbitration: One Better Way, 69 A.B.A. J. 64, 65 
(1983) (“Although there is no readily available statistic concerning the time expended by judges 
in handling pretrial conferences, and settlement conferences, the experience of our judges 
indicates that the cases in the arbitration program, because of their early listing for the 
arbitration hearing, consume far less pretrial judicial time than the cases that are not eligible for 
arbitration.”). 
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waivers should not compromise the federal policy favoring 
arbitration. 
IV.  OTHER POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
This Note has demonstrated that a legislative response is not a 
viable solution to class waivers because of the many fairness and 
process problems associated with class arbitration. Highlighting 
inadequacies of suggested reforms is of little use, however, if there are 
no other potential solutions. In an oft-cited opinion, Justice Grodin of 
the California Supreme Court acknowledged that class arbitration, 
though an imperfect solution, “must be evaluated, not in relation to 
some ideal but in relation to its alternatives.”172 Justice Grodin 
concluded that when the alternative “is to force hundreds of 
individual [consumers] each to litigate its cause . . . in a separate 
arbitral forum, then the prospect of classwide arbitration, for all its 
difficulties, may be a better, more efficient, and fairer solution.”173 But 
allowing companies to avoid liability through use of class waivers is 
not the only alternative to implementation of class arbitration. 
Rather, other potential solutions exist. Congress could aim to lower 
consumers’ arbitration costs by providing attorneys’ fees or shifting 
costs onto businesses. Legislatures might also rely on administrative 
enforcement to deter business misconduct. Finally, even if a majority 
of jurisdictions choose not to adopt measures to protect consumers, 
Congress should limit choice-of-law provisions to prevent businesses 
from avoiding jurisdictions that do find class arbitration waivers 
unconscionable. These and other solutions warrant further 
examination by the legal community. This Part examines some of 
these potential solutions. 
A. Lower Individual Consumers’ Arbitration Costs 
Class waivers make it nearly impossible for some consumers to 
assert their claims. For low-value claimants, recovering an arbitral 
award is economically unfeasible, after factoring in attorneys’ fees 
and filing costs. The potential to aggregate claims might allow these 
consumers to seek relief. Because consumers are precluded from 
 
 172. Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982), rev’d in part sub nom. 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 173. Id. 
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seeking relief due to the high costs and low returns of individual 
arbitration, one potential solution is to lower those costs. 
1. Attorneys’ Fees.  Perhaps the easiest way to lower costs is to 
require losing businesses to reimburse all of a claimant’s reasonable 
attorneys’ fees. Though arbitration proceedings are informal, 
designed to allow participants to resolve disputes without legal 
counsel, complex consumer claims typically require an attorney’s 
assistance.174 Low-value claimants are unlikely to seek relief when the 
potential recovery is less than the attorney costs they must pay to 
obtain that relief. Although requiring businesses to pay reasonable 
attorneys’ fees would not entirely address the problems presented by 
class waivers,175 it would partially offset the high costs that prevent 
consumers from seeking relief. 
To achieve this result, Congress could ban fee-waiver clauses in 
arbitration agreements and allow the recovery of attorneys’ fees.176 
For instance, in Johnson v. West Suburban Bank,177 the Third Circuit 
held that an arbitration agreement was not unconscionable, in part 
because the federal statute governing the consumer’s claim permitted 
recovery of attorneys’ fees.178 If more consumer statutes permitted 
such a recovery, then the costs of asserting a low-value claim would at 
least partially be reduced. As a result, consumers would be more 
likely to assert low-value claims on an individual basis. 
2. Cost Shifting.  Another way to lower consumers’ costs is to 
shift some or all of the arbitration filing fees to the drafting party. 
AAA’s rules require that consumers with claims lower than $10,000 
are responsible for one half of the arbitrator’s fees, up to a maximum 
of $125, and businesses are responsible for most of the remaining 
 
 174. Sternlight, supra note 58, at 81. 
 175. See id. (suggesting that even when attorneys’ fees are recoverable, few attorneys would 
be willing to represent consumers with low-value claims). 
 176. This potential solution is certainly subject to the same critique offered earlier that 
Congress is unlikely to pass any legislation to protect consumers. See supra Part III.A. But 
because some consumer statutes already provide for attorneys’ fees, see, e.g., Truth-in-Lending 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(3) (2006) (allowing for the recovery of attorneys’ fees), perhaps this 
legislative action is more likely. 
 177. Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 178. Id. at 374. 
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costs.179 Though these rules are favorable to the consumer, they do not 
help those with very small claims. For many consumers, the $125 fee 
alone prevents filing a claim. As a result, the rules should provide 
that, for consumers with low-value claims, the business must pay the 
consumer’s fees. Under AAA’s rules, such a change would result in at 
most a shift of only $125. And though this would raise the company’s 
dispute-resolution costs, it seems unlikely that such a small shift in 
fees would lead businesses to avoid using arbitration. 
Unlike recovery of attorneys’ fees, however, cost shifting might 
be a difficult solution to implement. Legislation appears doubtful 
because the FAA likely would preempt any state statute requiring an 
arbitration provider to shift fees.180 Therefore, consumers would likely 
have to depend on courts to provide this type of relief.181 Courts could 
make it a point to consider the fees imposed on the consumer 
whenever arbitration agreements are challenged. The Supreme Court 
suggested in Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph182 that 
when large arbitration costs preclude consumers from vindicating 
their statutory rights in arbitration, the arbitration agreement should 
be considered unenforceable.183 In making this determination, courts 
could effectively require arbitration providers to shift the fees onto 
businesses by invalidating any arbitration agreement that fails to 
provide for such a shift in the case of low-value claimants. As courts 
continue to invalidate agreements, many companies may voluntarily 
begin to shift fees to themselves to continue use of arbitration. 
Arbitration providers might also amend their rules to require such a 
shift to retain as many disputes as possible. 
 
 179. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Consumer Arbitration Costs (effective July 1, 2003), 
http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22039. 
 180. For a brief explanation of the preemptive effect of the FAA, see supra notes 116–17 
and accompanying text. 
 181. Because of this dependency, shifting costs may prove to be an inadequate solution. 
Some courts might find that arbitration agreements failing to shift costs are unconscionable, 
whereas others might refuse to invalidate these agreements. This result, which is very similar to 
courts’ treatment of class arbitration waivers, would provide consumers little relief. 
 182. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 183. See id. at 90 (“It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude 
a litigant . . . from effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”). 
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B. Rely on Administrative Enforcement to Protect Consumers 
Class arbitration waivers are problematic, not only for leaving 
low-value claimants without adequate relief, but also because they 
allow companies to avoid liability and continue detrimental and 
possibly illegal activities.184 Because consumers are unable to assert 
their claims, businesses are not held liable for their actions. As a 
result, they continue their illegal actions, giving rise to yet more 
consumer injuries. In addition to lowering consumer costs, one way 
Congress could hold businesses accountable for their conduct is to 
rely on administrative enforcement. Even if courts continue to uphold 
class arbitration waivers, precluding many consumers from asserting 
their claims, legislators can ensure that businesses are held liable—
and that their misconduct is hindered—by amending consumer 
statutes to include administrative enforcement mechanisms. 
For example, the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA)185 empowers the 
Federal Trade Commission to enforce individual compliance with all 
of TILA’s requirements.186 If a company violates TILA, its actions 
could go unpunished in the absence of this enforcement mechanism, 
because individual consumers might lack the financial incentives to 
seek relief. But the Federal Trade Commission’s penalties serve as a 
punishment, deterring violations of TILA. Courts have acknowledged 
that administrative enforcement mechanisms reduce the concerns 
accompanying class waivers.187 Federal agencies can impose penalties 
to deter misconduct, even when private enforcement is unavailable 
due to class waivers. The effect is not to provide consumers with relief 
for their claims, though agency enforcement can include awards to 
private parties; rather, administrative enforcement inhibits the 
conduct giving rise to the consumers’ claims in the first place. If more 
of the statutes concerning consumer arbitration proceedings contain 
administrative enforcement mechanisms, more low-value claimants 
will be able to seek relief. 
 
 184. For an explanation of the problems accompanying class arbitration waivers, see supra 
Part I.B. 
 185. Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–67 (2006). 
 186. 15 U.S.C. § 1607(c). 
 187. See, e.g., Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 375 (3d Cir. 2000) (enforcing an 
arbitration agreement containing a class waiver clause because TILA’s provisions make public 
enforcement available). 
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C. Limit the Use of Choice-of-Law Provisions in Arbitration 
Agreements 
Even if the majority of courts continue to uphold class 
arbitration waivers and legislatures elect not to take measures to 
increase business accountability, Congress should consider limiting 
the use of choice-of-law provisions to prevent businesses from 
avoiding those jurisdictions that consider class waivers 
unconscionable. Though the majority of courts generally consider 
class waivers valid and enforceable, a growing number have begun to 
scrutinize these waivers and their effect on consumers.188 The growing 
support for consumer protection, however, even if it became support 
among a majority of the American judiciary, would still be insufficient 
to provide the relief called for by this Note because of use of choice-
of-law provisions by corporations. Because American law treats 
arbitration agreements as a contract between the drafting party and 
the consumer,189 businesses are generally able to select the forum and 
the applicable law that will govern any disputes.190 Businesses, aware 
that some courts are critical of class waivers, have begun to 
incorporate choice-of-law provisions within their arbitration 
agreements to impose on consumers business-favorable laws.191 The 
credit card industry, for instance, has successfully used choice-of-law 
provisions to impose Delaware law on all consumers subject to the 
industry’s arbitration agreements.192 Thus, even if California 
consumers have a colorable claim that a particular arbitration 
agreement is unconscionable under California law, those consumers 
 
 188. For a summary of the various courts’ treatment of class waivers, see supra Part I.D. 
 189. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 190. Cindy G. Buys, The Arbitrators’ Duty to Respect the Parties’ Choice of Law in 
Commercial Arbitration, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 59, 59 (2005). 
 191. See Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregation and Its Discontents: Class Settlement Pressure, 
Class-Wide Arbitration, and CAFA, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1872, 1908–09 (2006) (evaluating 
businesses’ attempts to project nationwide the law of certain states in all arbitration 
agreements). Businesses also prefer to use choice-of-law clauses for efficiency reasons. Edward 
Brunet, The Appropriate Role of State Law in the Federal Arbitration System: Choice and 
Preemption, in ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 150, at 
63, 74 (explaining that choice-of-law clauses are popular among contract drafters because they 
“help to achieve simplicity in an overly complex legal and business world by restricting the 
number of potentially applicable laws and thereby reducing the transaction costs of negotiating 
and contracting”). 
 192. Nagareda, supra note 191, at 1909. 
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might still be forced into arbitration if the company can successfully 
apply another state’s unconscionability laws. 
This is a troubling result because companies can continue to use 
class waivers even if nearly every state’s laws hold that they are 
unconscionable, so long as one state’s laws treat these clauses 
favorably. The inclusion of choice-of-law provisions might therefore 
negate any progress made by consumers in defeating class waivers. As 
a result, absent national legislation precluding the use of class 
waivers, consumer advocates must find a way to limit companies’ 
ability to use choice-of-law provisions in arbitration agreements.193 
CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated over twenty-five years ago by Justice Grodin of 
the California Supreme Court, class arbitration waivers have the 
potential to significantly burden consumers seeking to hold businesses 
liable for their misconduct.194 Class waivers regularly preclude 
consumers such as Gene Dale from obtaining relief. But imagine how 
Dale’s story might have changed had Congress passed legislation 
barring the use of class waivers in arbitration agreements, as 
numerous commentators have called for. Dale and his fellow 
subscribers could then have brought a class claim against Comcast in 
an arbitration proceeding. Given the inadequacies of the class 
arbitration rules, however, both the subscribers and Comcast would 
sacrifice significant procedural protections. Discovery would be 
limited, many of the parties involved would play little or no role in 
selecting the arbitrator, and the consumers would have little chance of 
obtaining judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision. Or, in light of 
these concerns, Comcast might instead have chosen to forgo 
arbitration altogether. Although Dale and other subscribers would 
then be free to file a class claim against Comcast, so too would 
countless other consumers. Dale would almost certainly face years of 
litigation before recovering his $10.56. 
To some, these results might seem superior to the existing 
situation, justifying a bar of class waivers. But if consumers deserve 
meaningful protection from business misconduct, consumer advocates 
 
 193. But see Brunet, supra note 191, at 75 (maintaining that courts should enforce choice-of-
law clauses because they advance party autonomy). 
 194. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
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must shift their focus to new solutions. This Note has proposed three 
solutions. First, courts, legislatures, or arbitration bodies could shift 
attorneys’ fees and arbitration costs for consumers. Second, 
legislatures could create administrative agencies to punish business 
misconduct. Third, Congress should limit companies’ power to use 
choice-of-law provisions in arbitration agreements. Unless scholars 
examine these and other solutions, class waivers will continue to hurt 
the Gene Dales of the world. 
